Ampersand Energy has shifted strategy in East Africa’s increasingly crowded electric vehicle market. The Rwanda and Kenya-based company announced this week it would open its battery-swap network to global vehicle manufacturers, starting with Asian producer Wylex Mobility.
The decision marks a departure from the vertically integrated model that has defined African e-mobility. Instead of competing on motorcycle hardware, Ampersand is positioning itself as infrastructure — providing batteries, swap stations, and connecting software to any manufacturer meeting its quality standards.
“We realised we add the most value on the energy side,” says Josh Whale, Ampersand’s CEO. “Customers want more motorcycle options, but they still want to stay on our network because of reliability.”
The move comes as African e-mobility attracted over $158m in 2025 across 25 distinct investors, according to data compiled by Launch Base Africa. But the funding landscape reveals stark imbalances that are forcing strategic responses.
The capital disparity
One company dominates the numbers. Spiro, a UAE-headquartered pan-African operator, recently raised $100m from The Fund for Export Development in Africa (FEDA) and undisclosed strategic investors. That single round represents 63% of all African e-mobility funding in 2025.
Remove Spiro and the picture changes dramatically. Eleven companies raised an average round size of $5.3m. Arc Ride in Kenya secured at least $15m total. Ghana’s Kofa raised $8.1m. Ampersand closed $7m in debt facilities.
The disparity creates competitive pressure. Spiro can deploy across multiple markets simultaneously with substantially more resources per country. Smaller operators must concentrate capital in single cities or find alternative approaches.
“Spiro can afford to operate at losses for years while building network density,” one Nairobi-based climate tech investor told Launch Base Africa earlier. “The smaller companies need unit economics to work within 24 months or they run out of money.”
The infrastructure pivot
Ampersand’s response is to exit direct hardware competition. The company is unbundling what Whale describes as “the most profitable part” of its business — the battery and energy layer.
The economics support this calculation. Ampersand currently delivers more than 20,000 swaps daily across Kenya and Rwanda. Each swap costs riders approximately $2 for roughly 80km of range, representing a 35% cost reduction compared to petrol. At current volumes, swap revenue totals approximately $40,000 daily, or $14.6m annually.
“The energy business for motorbikes in Africa is probably five times larger than the motorcycle industry itself,” Whale says.
Ampersand plans to build 50 to 60 strategically located swap stations in Nairobi and Kigali. The company estimates this network could support 100,000 to 150,000 motorcycles per city. At scale in Nairobi alone, that could generate $73m in annual swap revenue.
Under the partnership announced this week, Ampersand provides batteries and swap station access while Wylex supplies motorcycle hardware. The bikes will be assembled at Ampersand’s Nairobi factory, with riders accessing them through existing asset-finance partners.
Wylex brings nearly three decades of manufacturing experience and specific features Kenyan riders request, including flat seats that Ampersand’s own Alpha motorcycle lacks.
“With nearly three decades of engineering experience, we build strong and long-lasting vehicles,” says Eileen Huang, Wylex’s CEO. “Ampersand’s customer focus and reliable swap network made them the ideal partner for our entry into East Africa.”
The arrangement creates an unusual dynamic: Ampersand’s own Alpha motorcycle now competes directly with Wylex bikes on the same energy infrastructure.
“Yes, they compete with the Alpha. That’s healthy,” Whale says. “Our customers benefit from Wylex’s manufacturing and R&D capacity, their price point, and features.”
The standardisation challenge
Battery swapping faces a fundamental problem across African e-mobility: incompatible battery form factors. Different manufacturers use batteries that don’t work across networks. A rider using one company’s swap system cannot switch to a competitor without different vehicle equipment.
This creates lock-in effects and winner-take-most dynamics where the first company achieving network density in a city secures customer loyalty. Seven of twelve African e-mobility companies that raised funding this year focus on battery-swapping infrastructure rather than vehicle charging, making standardisation increasingly critical.
Ampersand’s open network approach could establish a de facto standard if additional manufacturers join. But success depends on convincing competitors to participate.
Whale frames Arc Ride, Spiro, and other operators as “potential allies rather than competitors,” suggesting Ampersand would welcome them joining its network. “They are much more potential allies than competitors,” he says.
Whether these companies accept remains unclear. Arc Ride operates a closed battery-swapping model with significant backing from British International Investment and French climate fund Mirova. The company must now decide whether to maintain its integrated approach or follow Ampersand toward platform infrastructure.
Spiro’s $100m capital position allows it to pursue a different path entirely — deploying across multiple markets with enough resources to achieve density through scale rather than standardisation.
The funding landscape reveals a sector heavily dependent on development banks rather than traditional venture capital. Development finance institutions (DFIs) account for approximately 70% of disclosed capital in African e-mobility. Climate-focused funds contribute roughly 15%. Traditional venture capital represents less than 5%.
British International Investment (BII), the UK’s development finance institution, appears in more deals than any other investor. The DFI backed Arc Ride with $5m and Ampersand with a portion of its $7m debt facility. BII also participated in Sun King’s $156m solar securitisation, demonstrating appetite for asset-backed African energy investments.
France’s Proparco recently invested in Nairobi-based electric bus operator BasiGo. The Development Bank of Southern Africa provided $5.6m to Zero Carbon Charge. Rwanda Green Fund co-invested in Ampersand alongside international partners.
French asset manager Mirova deployed up to $10m in debt facilities for Arc Ride. The structure reflects climate fund preferences: debt rather than equity, targeting companies with subscription revenues that can service interest payments. Arc Ride’s battery-swapping model, where motorcycle taxi riders pay daily or weekly fees, generates predictable cash flow that makes debt financing viable.
Market dynamics
Kenya recorded 68,804 new motorcycle registrations in 2024, with 4,862 electric — a 7.1% share. Sub-Saharan Africa has approximately 27 million motorcycles, with over 2 million internal-combustion motorcycles operating in Kenya alone, most used for commercial transport.
East Africa concentrates most e-mobility capital. Six companies operate across Kenya, Rwanda, and Uganda. Kenya leads with Spiro, Arc Ride, and Enzi Mobility. Rwanda has Ampersand. Uganda has GOGO Electric.
The concentration reflects commercial motorcycle market size and regulatory environments. Kenya’s motorcycle taxi market numbers in the hundreds of thousands, providing commercial use cases that personal vehicle electrification lacks. Riders spend $5–10 daily on fuel — $1,800–3,600 annually — making EV economics compelling with 18–24 month payback periods.
Rwanda’s government actively supports electrification through fast-track approvals, tax incentives, and public procurement. The country’s compact geography and Kigali’s density enable network effects at smaller scale than sprawling Nairobi.
Strategic calculations
Ampersand’s pivot rests on a calculation that infrastructure generates better returns than hardware in African e-mobility. Network effects compound over time, switching costs keep riders on reliable networks, and recurring swap revenue provides predictable cash flow.
The model separates high-margin energy infrastructure from lower-margin vehicle manufacturing. Partners fund motorcycle purchases while Ampersand focuses on batteries. Every additional manufacturer joining the network accelerates adoption without Ampersand funding vehicle acquisition.
Whether this approach neutralises Spiro’s capital advantage depends on execution speed and manufacturer adoption. Spiro can deploy across countries simultaneously with 6–10x more capital per market. Ampersand must convince manufacturers to join its network and riders to trust the multi-brand system quickly enough to establish market position.
The company’s existing operational scale provides advantages. With 20,000 daily swaps and six years of operational data, Ampersand has proven reliability that new entrants lack. The open network model could accelerate this advantage if manufacturers view Ampersand’s infrastructure as lower-risk than building proprietary systems.
Arc Ride faces similar strategic decisions. The company secured substantial DFI backing for its closed battery-swapping model. Opening its network could accelerate growth but would require abandoning the vertical integration that attracted initial investors.
For now, Ampersand is betting that platform economics trump capital deployment in African e-mobility.
“Ultimately, the more great motorcycles riders can choose from, the faster the market grows,” Whale says. “Every new bike that joins our network makes the entire system stronger.”
The claim will be tested as the sector moves from fundraising to operational execution. Development banks provided the capital. Whether companies can convert that into sustainable businesses without permanent subsidy dependence remains the central question facing African e-mobility.