If you follow the money in African electric mobility, the trail leads not to Sand Hill Road or London’s VC hubs, but to the halls of state-backed development banks.
In 2025, African e-mobility companies has raised over $158m, attracting 25+ distinct investors across debt, equity, and grant structures. On the surface, the figure looks healthy. However, a look at the cap tables reveals a stark reality: traditional venture capital has largely exited the chat. Development finance institutions (DFIs) now account for approximately 70% of disclosed capital, with climate funds filling the gap via debt facilities. The question is whether this capital structure can build a sustainable industry — or just creates DFI dependency.
The money map
One company dominates the numbers. Spiro, a UAE-headquartered pan-African e-mobility operator, raised $100m from The Fund for Export Development in Africa (FEDA) and undisclosed strategic investors. That single round exceeds all other African e-mobility funding combined.
Remove Spiro and the picture changes dramatically: eleven companies raised roughly $58m from development banks, climate funds, and a handful of venture investors. The average round size drops to approximately $5m. The typical investor isn’t a VC — it’s a government-backed development institution or climate-focused fund.
The analysis suggests that e-mobility in Africa is fundamentally a development-finance story rather than a venture-capital one, with unit economics that fall outside typical VC timelines and leave the sector reliant on patient capital willing to accept infrastructure-level returns.
Development banks lead every category
British International Investment (BII), the UK’s development finance institution, appears in more deals than any other investor. The DFI backed Kenya’s Arc Ride with $5m for electric motorcycle deployment and Rwanda’s Ampersand with a portion of a $7m debt facility. BII also participated in Sun King’s $156m solar securitisation — adjacent to e-mobility but demonstrating appetite for asset-backed African energy investments.
Development Bank of Southern Africa provided $5.6m to Zero Carbon Charge for EV charging infrastructure — one of the few pure charging plays in the data rather than battery-swapping. The South African government-backed institution operates with a domestic infrastructure mandate, viewing EV charging as critical for the country’s industrial transition.
FEDA’s $100m into Spiro represents the largest single development finance commitment. The pan-African fund typically backs regional infrastructure rather than single-country deployments, suggesting Spiro plans cross-border expansion requiring standardised battery systems and operational procedures.
Rwanda Green Fund, a government-backed institution, co-invested in Ampersand alongside international partners. The participation signals policy alignment — Rwanda’s government actively supports transport electrification as part of its climate strategy, fast-tracking approvals and providing regulatory certainty international investors require.
E3 Capital, a Kenyan investor, backed Ghana’s Kofa alongside Shell Foundation and other development and climate finance institutions. Kofa raised $8.1m to deploy battery-swapping infrastructure for electric motorcycles across Ghana, with plans to expand into Kenya and Togo.
Analysts say government participation de-risks the investment by ensuring regulatory barriers won’t emerge unexpectedly, licensing processes won’t stall, and import duties won’t suddenly increase.
The development bank concentration isn’t unique to Africa. E-mobility in Southeast Asia and Latin America shows similar patterns, with infrastructure investors dominating early rounds before commercial capital enters at scale. The question is whether African markets will attract commercial investors eventually — or remain development finance dependent indefinitely.
Climate funds provide growth debt
French asset manager Mirova deployed $30m across African climate tech in 2025, including up to $10m in debt facilities for Arc Ride. The structure reflects climate fund preferences: debt rather than equity, targeting companies with subscription revenues that can service interest payments.
Arc Ride operates a battery-swapping model where motorcycle taxi riders pay daily or weekly fees. The predictable cash flow makes debt financing possible — unlike equity-only models requiring years before profitability. Mirova also provided similar debt structures to d.light (solar) and KOKO Networks (clean cooking), suggesting a consistent strategy across asset-light subscription businesses.
Gaia Impact, another French climate fund, invested in Rwanda’s Ampersand alongside eight other investors including BII, TotalEnergies, and Seedstars. The blended structure — mixing DFI capital, corporate strategic investment, and impact equity — characterises most African e-mobility deals. No single investor type dominates; companies stitch together capital from institutions with completely different mandates.
Our analysts note a pattern in which climate deals are almost always blended finance, requiring grant capital for R&D, equity for infrastructure, and debt for vehicle scaling.
The Energy and Environment Partnership provided $320,000 in grant funding to South Africa’s Zimi for vehicle-to-grid technology development. Grants support pre-commercial R&D that equity investors won’t fund and DFIs consider too early. But grant dependency raises questions about commercial viability — can these companies eventually operate without concessional capital?
Shell Foundation, the oil major’s impact investment arm, deployed substantial capital into Ghana’s Kofa as part of the $8.1m round. The UK charity committed £3.8m ($4.9m) co-funded with the UK Government’s Transforming Energy Access platform. Shell Foundation also backed clean energy companies in other markets, signalling concentrated interest in African energy access solutions.
Africa Go Green Fund, a UK-based climate specialist, backed Uganda’s GOGO Electric with undisclosed capital. The investment represents one of the few e-mobility bets in Uganda, a smaller market than Kenya or Rwanda where most capital concentrates.
Traditional VC is mostly absent
Only about five traditional venture capital firms appear in the e-mobility deals we reviewed, and three operate with explicit impact mandates rather than pure financial return objectives.
Acumen, a US-based impact investor known for “patient capital” with decade-long hold periods, invested in Ampersand. The firm accepts sub-market returns for social impact, placing it closer to development finance than traditional VC.
Seedstars Africa Ventures, a Swiss fund focused on emerging markets, also backed Ampersand. The firm operates across sectors but concentrates on founders in frontier markets where traditional VCs don’t deploy.
Flourish Ventures, via its Madica programme, provided $200,000 to Tunisia’s Pixii Motors. The pre-seed check represents exploratory exposure rather than core portfolio commitment — Madica writes small tickets to multiple African startups as an option on future opportunities.
Gather Ventures backed Zimbabwe’s Mobility for Africa with undisclosed capital. The US-based impact investor focuses on frontier markets, accepting higher risk for potential development impact.
Notably absent: major VCs active in African fintech and software. Neither Y Combinator, TLcom Capital, Partech, nor other prominent African venture investors appear in e-mobility deals. The sector’s capital intensity, long payback periods, and operational complexity deter investors seeking software margins and five-year exits.
The VC absence creates a funding gap. Companies raising $1–3m seeds struggle to find $10–20m Series A capital. Development banks typically require operational maturity before investing, but reaching that maturity requires more capital than seed rounds provide. Some companies stall in this “missing middle” or raise down rounds from DFIs at lower valuations than VCs initially paid.
Corporate venture limited but strategic
Only two corporate investors appear in the African e-mobility dataset: TotalEnergies and Suzuki Global Ventures.
TotalEnergies invested in Ampersand as part of the $7m debt facility. The French energy major’s participation signals exploration of e-mobility infrastructure before potential commercial entry. TotalEnergies operates fuel distribution networks across Africa; understanding battery swapping positions the company for potential pivot as transport electrifies.
“Energy companies are learning about e-mobility in Africa because regulations are simpler than in Europe,” a Lagos-based e-mobility consultant tells Launch Base Africa. “You can test business models here before deploying in OECD markets where permitting and standards take years.”
Suzuki Global Ventures led an $11m investment in Kenya’s Peach Cars, a used vehicle marketplace rather than pure e-mobility play. But the automotive manufacturer’s interest signals positioning for eventual African EV market development. Peach Cars provides Suzuki visibility into vehicle financing, distribution, and consumer preferences ahead of launching electric models. The automaker recently secured its first approval for EV sales in Australia, signalling its readiness to compete in that sector if needed.
Three other Japanese entities co-invested in Peach Cars: Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC), Gogin Capital, and University of Tokyo Edge Capital. The coordinated investment suggests Japanese corporate interest in East African mobility infrastructure, though focused on market understanding rather than immediate commercial deployment.
Notably absent from African e-mobility: major automotive OEMs (Toyota, Volkswagen, Honda), Chinese EV manufacturers (BYD, Geely, Nio), battery producers (CATL, LG, Panasonic), and charging infrastructure companies (ChargePoint, EVgo). The absence suggests these players view African e-mobility as too early for corporate venture deployment, or African markets as too small for strategic priority.
Shell Foundation invested in clean energy companies Kofa and Koolboks, signalling strategic interest in battery-swapping infrastructure. Energy corporate interest in African climate tech encompasses both solar/off-grid solutions and transport electrification.
One unusual crypto experiment
Enzi Mobility raised $3.5m from Kula PCC, a Cayman Islands-registered Protected Cell Company, with “Equity + In-Kind” structure suggesting crypto or Web3 linkage.
The investment represents the only visible crypto capital in African e-mobility. Potential structures include tokenised vehicle ownership, DeFi-enabled rider financing, or stablecoin payment systems mitigating currency volatility. The Protected Cell Company structure allows fractional ownership and complex capital structures common in crypto deals.
Proponents of the model argue that crypto offers advantages for cross-border e-mobility by enabling access to global capital pools, managing multi-currency revenue, and supporting fractional vehicle ownership in ways traditional equity cannot.
However, there are questions on whether crypto adds value beyond marketing, on whether the complexity of blockchain, layered on top of already complex e-mobility operations, creates more problems than it solves.
No other crypto investors appear in African e-mobility despite active crypto VC in other African sectors. Binance Labs, Coinbase Ventures, Pantera — all active in African fintech — are absent from transport. The single Enzi Mobility investment suggests crypto interest remains exploratory rather than committed.
The battery-swapping consensus
Seven of twelve e-mobility companies focus on battery-swapping infrastructure rather than vehicle charging. The business model concentrates capital on swap stations and battery inventory rather than distributed charging points.
Battery swapping solves several African infrastructure challenges. Limited grid capacity makes widespread charging difficult in markets where electricity supply is unreliable. Upfront cost barriers disappear when riders don’t purchase batteries (40% of vehicle cost). Commercial motorcycle operators need fast “refueling” — 5 minutes for a battery swap versus 2+ hours for charging.
The model creates subscription revenue streams attractive to debt investors. Riders pay weekly or monthly fees for battery access, generating predictable cash flow. Asset ownership — the batteries themselves — provides collateral for debt financing. Network effects emerge as more swap stations increase system convenience and rider willingness to adopt.
Ghana’s Kofa exemplifies this approach, partnering with Chinese manufacturer TAILG to deploy electric motorcycles designed around Kofa’s extractable batteries. The company targets 6,000 batteries and 100 swap stations across Ghana, with battery swaps taking minutes at designated stations. Kofa plans to expand into Kenya and Togo, positioning for regional standardisation and deployment of 200,000 vehicles by 2030.
But battery swapping faces standardisation challenges. Different manufacturers use incompatible battery form factors. A rider using one company’s swap network can’t switch to a competitor without different vehicle equipment. This creates winner-take-most dynamics where the first company achieving network density in a city locks in customers.
Kofa addresses this through partnership with TAILG, enabling vehicle-battery integration from the start, while Spiro’s $100m raise positions the company to achieve density across multiple markets simultaneously. Competitors with $5–10m in funding face disadvantages — they must concentrate in single cities while Spiro can deploy across countries, potentially forcing consolidation or regional market division.
“Battery swapping is an infrastructure business with network effects,” a Lagos-based development finance investor confided in Launch Base Africa. “The company with the most capital will likely win each market. That’s why we’re seeing these large DFI commitments — you need scale to succeed.”
The alternative — charging infrastructure — appears in only two companies: South Africa’s Zero Carbon Charge ($5.6m) and Zimi ($320,000 grant). South Africa’s more reliable grid and higher household electrification make charging viable, but the limited investment suggests the model doesn’t work elsewhere in Africa yet.
East Africa draws the most capital
Six companies operate in East Africa (Kenya, Rwanda, Uganda), while Ghana emerges as West Africa’s e-mobility hub with Kofa’s $8.1m raise representing the region’s largest disclosed investment.
Kenya leads East Africa with three companies: Spiro, Arc Ride and Enzi Mobility. Rwanda has Ampersand, Uganda has GOGO Electric.
The concentration reflects commercial motorcycle (boda-boda) market size and regulatory environments. Kenya’s motorcycle taxi market numbers in hundreds of thousands, providing commercial use case that personal vehicle electrification lacks. Riders spend $5–10 daily on fuel — $1,800–3,600 annually — making EV economics compelling with 18–24 month payback periods.
Rwanda’s government actively supports electrification through fast-track approvals, tax incentives, and public procurement. The country’s compact geography and Kigali’s density enable network effects at smaller scale than sprawling Nairobi or Lagos. Rwanda positions itself as testbed for technologies that can scale across East Africa once proven.
Ghana’s Kofa demonstrates that West Africa can support e-mobility infrastructure despite different market dynamics than East Africa. The $8.1m raise — among West Africa’s largest e-mobility investments — suggests investor confidence in Ghanaian regulatory environment and commercial potential. Ghana has approximately 17,000 registered electric vehicles including two- and three-wheelers, representing one of Africa’s larger EV fleets.
South Africa has three companies (Zimi, Zero Carbon Charge, Everlectric) but pursuing different models than East Africa. Focus shifts from commercial motorcycles to charging infrastructure, fleet vehicles, and V2G technology. The more developed automotive market and reliable grid enable approaches impossible in markets with infrastructure constraints.
North Africa appears once: Tunisia’s Pixii Motors raised $200,000 for electric vehicle development. The positioning differs from East and West African deployment focus — Tunisia’s manufacturing capabilities and European proximity suggest export-oriented production rather than domestic market deployment.
Nigeria, West Africa’s largest economy, is surprisingly absent from e-mobility investment despite having a massive motorcycle taxi market. The absence suggests regulatory uncertainty, infrastructure challenges, or insufficient investor focus despite the region’s prominence in fintech and e-commerce. Kofa’s success in Ghana and planned expansion to Kenya highlights the complex business case for West African e-mobility — requiring multi-market strategies rather than single-country focus.
The $100m outlier question
Spiro’s funding dwarfs all other African e-mobility investment, raising questions about strategy, backers, and competitive implications.
FEDA’s participation suggests government backing across multiple African markets. The Fund for Export Development in Africa typically supports regional infrastructure enabling intra-African trade. A pan-African battery-swapping network fits that mandate — standardised systems allowing cross-border vehicle operation and battery interoperability.
The “undisclosed strategic investors” joining FEDA likely include automotive manufacturers, energy companies, or sovereign wealth funds. Chinese investors seem probable given China’s EV dominance and Africa infrastructure presence, though no confirmation exists. European or American battery manufacturers could be positioning for African market access.
Spiro’s UAE headquarters raises questions. Is this African e-mobility or Middle Eastern capital deploying in Africa? The company operates in African markets, but control and strategic direction may reflect different priorities than African-founded competitors.
The capital advantage creates competitive dynamics favouring Spiro. While Arc Ride operates in Kenya with at least $15m in funding and Ampersand in Rwanda with $7m, Spiro can simultaneously deploy across markets with 5–10x capital per country. The resource disparity likely forces smaller players into regional specialisation or acquisition discussions.
“Spiro can afford to operate at losses for years while building network density,” a Nairobi-based climate tech VC tells Launch Base Africa. “The smaller companies need unit economics to work within 24 months or they run out of money. That’s an unfair fight.”
Alternatively, Spiro’s $100m may prove too much capital too fast. Deployment speed rarely correlates linearly with capital — operational execution, regulatory navigation, and local partnerships matter more than funding. Several examples exist of over-capitalised African startups failing despite large rounds when operational complexity exceeded capital availability.
The sustainability question
Whether African e-mobility becomes commercially sustainable or remains dependent on concessional capital remains uncertain.
Development finance dominance raises concerns about subsidy dependency. If companies require DFI capital indefinitely, the sector resembles infrastructure requiring permanent government support rather than venture-backable technology businesses. Climate funds provide patient capital, but they’re still seeking financial returns alongside impact metrics — perpetual losses aren’t acceptable.
Unit economics tell different stories across companies. Commercial motorcycle operators in Kenya report 50–70% operating cost savings versus petrol, suggesting strong value proposition. But vehicle costs, battery replacement, and swap station operations create capital requirements that extend payback periods beyond VC timelines.
The debt financing emergence suggests some companies are achieving commercial traction. Mirova’s $10m debt facility to Arc Ride indicates confidence in subscription revenue predictability. Securitised structures for solar companies like Sun King demonstrate asset-backed lending works for pay-as-you-go models in African markets. E-mobility could follow similar paths: equity for infrastructure buildout, debt for vehicle scaling, operational cash flow eventually sustaining growth.
Exit paths remain unclear. Who acquires e-mobility companies? Energy corporates like TotalEnergies represent logical buyers, but only one has invested so far. Automotive OEMs could acquire for market access, though Suzuki’s positioning through Peach Cars suggests preference for distribution understanding over direct operation.
The most likely outcome involves strategic acquisition by corporates or consolidation funded by development finance institutions seeking to create regional champions.
What the numbers show
Capital deployed:
- Total disclosed: $158m+ across 12 companies
- Spiro alone: $100m (63% of total)
- Remaining 11 companies: $58m combined
- Average non-Spiro round: $5.3m
Investor breakdown:
- Development finance institutions: 70%+ of disclosed capital
- Climate-focused funds: ~15% of disclosed capital
- Traditional venture capital: <5% of disclosed capital
- Corporate venture: <5% of disclosed capital
- Crypto/alternative: <5% of disclosed capital
Most active investors:
- British International Investment (BII): 2 deals
- Shell Foundation: 1 deal, $4.9m+ (Kofa)
- Mirova (France): 1 deal, $10m+ debt
- Development Bank of Southern Africa: 1 deal, $5.6m
- FEDA: 1 deal, $100m (portion)
- E3 Capital (Kenya): 1 deal (Kofa)
Geographic concentration:
- East Africa (Kenya, Rwanda, Uganda): 5 companies
- West Africa (Ghana): 1 company (Kofa — $8.1m)
- South Africa: 3 companies
- Tunisia: 1 company
- Zimbabwe: 1 company
- Pan-African: 1 company (Spiro)
Business models:
- Battery swapping: 7 companies (58%)
- Charging infrastructure: 2 companies (17%)
- Mixed/unclear: 3 companies (25%)
Funding structures:
- Pure equity: 8 companies (67%)
- Debt facilities: 2 companies (17%)
- Grants: 1 company (8%)
- Equity + in-kind (crypto): 1 company (8%)
Largest investments:
- Spiro (Pan-African): $100m
- Arc Ride (Kenya): $15m total
- Kofa (Ghana): $8.1m
- Ampersand (Rwanda): $7m
- Zero Carbon Charge (South Africa): $5.6m
What it means
African electric mobility investment reveals an infrastructure sector masquerading as technology. Development finance institutions provide 70% of capital because commercial investors — venture capital and most corporates — view the sector as too capital-intensive, operationally complex, and slow-returning for standard investment models.
This creates a paradox. E-mobility requires substantial capital to reach the network density where unit economics work, but the capital requirements deter the investors capable of writing large cheques quickly. Development finance fills the gap but moves slower, requires more governance, and operates under different success metrics than venture capital.
The sector’s viability depends on proving commercial sustainability. If companies can reach profitability on DFI and climate fund capital, demonstrating 5–7 year payback periods with acceptable returns, commercial investors might enter at scale. If profitability remains elusive, e-mobility joins infrastructure sectors permanently dependent on concessional capital.
For founders, the investor landscape dictates strategy. Building an African e-mobility company means becoming expert in development finance, blended structures, and patient capital. Traditional venture fundraising approaches don’t apply. The companies attracting the most capital combine commercial viability narratives with climate impact metrics satisfying DFI mandates.
The question for 2026 is whether any African e-mobility company can demonstrate strong enough unit economics to attract traditional growth equity or strategic acquisition interest. Until that happens, development finance will continue dominating — which may be appropriate for infrastructure, but limits the sector’s ability to scale at the speed climate urgency requires.